September 26, 2017 
 Tuesday 
 
 

Forum
Topic:
Ideal Time for Facts

       

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 By Dave I.

05/18/2009  4:34PM

Thank You everybody for your concern and help with the opposition to SB 670. It was item 41 on the Senate Floor session today. Senator Wiggins was kind enough to "pass" when it was requested for consideration.
 By Dave I.

05/17/2009  10:46PM

The one good thing that has come from this threat that it has alerted and united we the people of the future legislation that will destroy our rights under the 1872 Mining law, This fight is only beginning.
 By Dave I.

05/17/2009  10:40PM

We know the Truth,the Senator who wrote SB 670/Wiggins,Vacuum or suction dredge Equipment, knows the truth, but has chose to ignore the truth for the prejudice of her own advocacy to destroy our rights to dredge for gold in our rivers and streams.
 By Rick

05/17/2009  6:21PM

In combination with Mike's letter to the Gov, including the latest Misc topic additions concerning the pending vote to abolish dredging:

WHY? Because they can? Becuase they have no clue of physics or history or logic? (Ahem, Rick....yes...)

Wake up!!!!!!

Those of us taking up the challenge to contact "representatives" (I want to gag sometimes when I need to refer to them as such) ....please remind them of this truth:

Rocks in the rivers are round because they roll. Theyv'e been rolling around for billions of years because water rolls them. Water is a force made from snow. It's caused by weather. The weather has been happening for 4.6 billion years.

The weather and rock-rolling didn't start when this current group of idiots believe their own personal short-sided version of history started.

Rocks the size of busses, even ten busses roll and shape our rivers every year. Give me a freaking reality check.

The rocks in our rivers are and have been rolling around and re-creating habitat for longer than human-kind can even fathom. Except, wait....history just started for idiots with self-centered short-brained reference points.

Let me see..."we'd better outlaw dredging the rivers because it disturbs the habitat" or whatever other anthropomorphic pipe-dream reaches their egotistical and blind reasoning.

I am ashamed of my own human species trying to take credit for why river rocks are roundy. Give me a flying break!!!!
 By Rick

05/05/2009  4:39PM

In hind-sight, I wish it hadn't turned into hind-sight....Bluejay, you called it when the Dow was still around 13500, and I didn't get out and into gold, although...so I'm riding this one through, to a point. This time my exit point is quite relatively low.

Strange as it is, gold is a super buy, even at $1000, considering the looming inflationary inevitablity...yet another derivative. This time I'm listening.
 By bluejay

05/05/2009  12:26AM

"How Wall Street And Washington Betrayed America"

http://www.kitco.com/ind/Wilson/may042009.html

Let the light shine brightly on the truth!
 By Rick

05/03/2009  5:36PM

Good commentary, Bluejay.

One key phase that you wrote, "Doesn't the government know...?" is unfortunately answered in truth:

My commentary, "Yes, with the super-majority, the government does know what it's doing..."

And that is: a Statist agenda.

This is all happening not by chance, but by the purpose of destroying the free market.
 By bluejay

05/02/2009  11:24PM

Rick

My Congressperson knows exactly what I feel which is no different, I'm sure, with the way you are feeling. I've told her that I'm extremely unhappy with the way the bank lobbyists are running our Representatives to legislate against us while they were placed there by the voters not the bankers.

I have told her that it wouldn't surprise me if none of the current Congressional Representatives were returned to office once the people have their next turn. I have told her that a seriously backed third party will emerge to vote them all out with new people who are more inclined to represent the will of the voters and not the highly paid banking lobbyists with money paid to them probably from our TARP funding that was ordered by King Paulson.

We need real reform in this country and I am directly referring to how the current government operates and especially, the judiciary.

The biggest problem from where I view it is the current ability of judges to play god with people's lives on cooked up charges from Federal prosecutors who are just interested in their convictions rate to put on their resumes for a better paying jobs.

In our country the conviction rate for Federal prosecutors is in the range from 98% to 98.5%. This is a higher rate that existed during the times of Nazi Germany and the Spanish Inquisition.

I'm not the only one that feels this way. In Martin Armstrong's letter of April 15, 2009, available at http://www.scribd.com, entitled "Financial Panics = Political Change" he gets into the topic of judicial reform with examples of past abuses by judges.

The major problem with judges is there in no public tribunal of accountability and even the Senate or Congress doesn't possess the current will to rake them over the coals when events dictate it.

Aside from the judges, the SEC and Commodities Futures Trading Commission are no better. The big fish seldom gets hooked. When was the last time the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was used to catch a big fish?

Doesn't the government know what the banks have done to all of us on interest rates and fees on their charge cards? I call this a cartel effort to suck blood from us when all the way back to the Roman Empire usuary laws protected its citizens with a cap of just under 10%. The reason why the economy is sick and getting worse is because we are paying a great deal of our income for interest to the banks and it is being withheld from going directly into the economy. It is a moral crime to allow the banking institutions to act as a loan shark business when lower rates would create jobs and put some people back to work.

If anyone is inclined to get a little more educated, I suggest that they access Martin Armstrong's mentioned essay under the sub-topic of "Judicial Reform Is Vital To Our Economy" in his April 15, 2009 letter.
 By Rick

05/02/2009  9:13PM

I almost wrote under the topic "Another US Citizen goes Foreign" but I haven't left yet....because I still have some fight in me.

Our slanderous whipping by the unconstitutional rulings by the Statist judicial crap concerning the CDAA's railroad construction planted over Constitutional civility was on;y a precursor to what is unravelling in front odf all of us....what is happening in Washington, both from the executive and congressional branches? Tyranny! It is the very nightmare our Founders rebelled against....

Yet...I sit here and witness ignorance, passivity, capitulation, dilution of principal, to name a few symptoms of our otherwise former fighting sovereign nation of freedom fighters and defenders of the Constitution.

IS EVERYONE ASLEEP????

Where and when can we mount a Constitutional challenge to this aggregious mess?

George would be the first to knock down the door. Both of them.
 By Michael Miller

01/22/2009  2:57PM

Gold Sector problems existing within six of the large or well-known gold mining companies are obscure to disclosure. One problem exists for all but one of the companies listed below, which seems to have no significant problems. Some of the companies have multiple issues. Here are the companies discussed (alphabetical order):
AngloGoldAshanti Ltd, Barrick Gold Corp,
GoldCorp Inc, Kinross Gold,
Newmont Mining Corp, Teck Corp

Here are the problems in no particular order:
1. Too few miners in senior management (accountants, lawyer types).
2. Poor or declining property.
3. Big challenges due to quality of assets.
4. Trouble in financing acquisitions.
5. Poor decisions on engineering and execution of engineered plans.
6. Non mining, political interferences.

These six companies share the bulk of volume (share trading) in the marketplace with about 2.5 trillion shares outstanding.
 By Michael Miller

12/09/2008  4:01PM

Another story about the serious problems of counterfeit coins (see 12/02/08 entry below) was released by the American Numismatic Association in Colorado Springs, Co. Full story found at its web site, www.money.org.

Excerpt: “New counterfeit operations have sprung up across the world, particularly in China, where relaxed laws protect these operations from liability. The counterfeiters use clever production methods and cutting-edge die-making technology, creating forgeries that are difficult for most collectors to detect. A wide variety of counterfeit objects are being produced, including U.S. and world coins, paper money, errors, and even slabs. With the assistance of unprincipled dealers and investors, this new material is flooding the market at an astonishing rate, compromising the investments of collectors and the integrity of honest dealers. “
BUYERS BEWARE !11
 By bluejay

12/07/2008  3:37PM

The shareholders of the Sixteen to One along with the company, like others in the country, are being subjected to cash flow problems as income slows down for a myriad of reasons, not to mention the shrinking value of our money as a result of the continuing trials of expanding inflation.

The day is coming when debt, if not eliminated or reduced to manageable levels, will control our destiny. If debt continues then it will only become magnified as our purchasing power shrinks to levels where we may not be able to service it in the future which is coming sooner that most believe.

Its really quite ironic that the banks get so much help. Rothschild of western Europe is worth $500 trillion which is half the world's wealth and their right hand in the U.S., being represented by the privately owned Fed and J.P. Morgan a large recipient of bailout funds. The Fed and J.P. Morgan should be asking Rothchild for money, not us. Can you imagine one thing that $500 trillion couldn't buy(government reprsentatives?).

Our debt that people owe the banks was never their money, they were allowed to print it based on consumer deposits and collected interest from us based on someone else's money. This is the reason that gold is manipulated, so the public is turned off by it thus leaving their savings in the bank for them to profit by.

Rothschild over their long history have made their money off the people like us along by using their influence to hand pick presidents, crashed stock markets(gold and silver shares?), bankrupted nations, orchestrated wars and have impoverished millions.

As shareholders we are owners of gold in the ground as opposed to the Rothschld's massive gold holdings in their underground vaults. We still have a chip in the big game with some other rich owners of gold but we must eliminate any risk of losing it by kicking out our debt responsibilities before they get out of hand.

I remember Boomtown just across I80 in Nevada has display cases of memorabilia including Silver. Why not ask them or other casino/hotels in Reno if they would be interested in any of our specimens for lobby displays? Why not contact large owners of gold companies in the western U.S. to see if they might have an interest?

If we can't sell our specimens or statues, the next step may be to saw them down for jewelry. I understand that this market is in short supply.

It appears that the board needs to make some immediate decisions concerning the elimination of our debt exposure.

During this same time period the board should be contacting mining or exploration gold companies to do a private placement with them for the cash we require to go on.
 By Michael Miller

12/02/2008  6:20PM

Three months ago I reported on the growing awareness that coin collectors were buying fake rare or high dollar gold coins. Many in the numismatic crowd feel secure with the coins in their possession and many felt that way because “professionals” gave them assurances that the coins were genuine. Even after a serious collector purposely purchased a fake coin in China, got it certified by an expert and told his story, collectors did not wish to believe the evidence.

Beth Deisher, editor of Coin World in the 12/15/08 edition, writes, “It’s up to collectors, dealers and grading services to fight the scourge of counterfeit coins from China, not the federal government with its limited resources.” I agree.

When I decided to seek out and add gold to my assets (1974), I studied all the ways to accomplish that desire. Owning an interest in a producing gold mine rose to the top of the list.

Coins are worthy because you can hold them, look at them and know that no matter what they are yours (assuming you take possession). Paying a huge premium above spot goes with the trade. I don’t like that. Now with the full-blown awareness that counterfeit coins are in the market place, I wonder how the coin business will deal with this serious problem. As an aside, the gold mining industry was alerted that counterfeit Krugerrands were in the market place, bought, sold and stored by unsuspecting gold bugs thirty years ago. It hardly made a ripple in their interest. This coin issue may be different.
 By Michael Miller

01/26/2007  11:14PM

What a dunce I can be.

The following three people are public servants working in Sacramento as lawyers. Tom Green’s title is “Chief Assistant Attorney General”. Under his supervision is Mary E. Hackenbracht. Her title is Senior Assistant Attorney General. I have no idea if the adjective “Senior” implies she is at the top of the hierarchy, just below Tom Green. Are their “Junior Assistant Attorney Generals”? Finally William N. Brienger signs on as a “Deputy Attorney General”. Are all three participants involved in the decision to launch an Amicus Brief against the parties damaged by lawlessness. After all, the top name on the list is Bill Lockyer, who signs on as “Attorney General of the State of California”. Did William write it, investigate its merits or initiate the action? Did Tom and Bill read prove and sign off before submitting the document to the appeals court?

Here is why I raise the above questions. The document says its position supports the lawless defendants. It recognizes that a law was broken. Then quickly words jump into a general assertion that the reason for filing the brief is “to assist district attorneys”. The writers want “to underscore the importance of prosecutorial immunity in fostering unflinching and impartial law enforcement”. I have no problem nor does our case bump against those goals. Immunity, however, is qualified that it must be “unflinching and impartial law enforcement”. The brief does not say unflinching or impartial. It says unflinching and impartial. The actions of the defendants broke laws. The actions of Gale Filter, et al., proved not to be impartial upon reviewing the grand jury transcript. Also documents in the Superior Court filings in Sierra County provide evidence that their impartiality was more wide spread than merely withholding exculpatory evidence.

It is a big leap to believe that Tom and Bill failed to stop the misguided position of their co-signed brief. But, what about Mary? As Senior Assistant, does she report to Tom? Does her position require a review over a Deputy Attorney General? Can a Deputy Attorney General file a brief in the Appellate Court on his own without a final review?

If you want to read the full amicus of the attorney general, it follows below . If anyone out there can help with the answers to these questions about the chain of accountability and responsibility, please educate me.

Now to the question of money, which was asked in the entry before this. The amicus brief comments that a lot of money is at issue. In the Statement of the Case it tells the appellate court that our suit seeks over $51 million. Yes, a recovery of that or a lesser amount can fund the mine’s development. I cannot recall determining this amount but certainly support its legitimacy. What if the suit sought $200 million or $1.00? Does the amount affect “unflinching and impartial law enforcement”? With so much written about case before the appellate judges, why did William fill his limited space with $51 million in damages?

Okay, I admit that this is a hard entry to read; however, remember the above named people are your public servants, who earn their salary by working for your best interests. Remember also, its all for the right to mine, the mine and its shareholders. So, get informed. Cut down some ignorance and help me learn. If you do not want to respond on the FORUM, do it with a feedback click.
 By greenhorn

11/26/2006  12:24PM

Just curious if settlement offers seem like a possibility, for all the usual reasons (and to provide an influx of some cash soon).
 By martin newkom

11/19/2006  6:25AM

The abuse of the law and constituents, manipulation of
Grand Juries and out and out
lying are tactics of the legal
profession that are as old and
as standard operating procedure
as the "world's oldest profession".
 By Michael Miller

11/15/2006  3:58PM

“When you ain’t got nothen’, you got nothen’ to lose”. Bob Dylan.


The defendants lost their excuses for immunity in the Superior Court. They now appeal to the Cal Appellate Court for amnesty from accountability on the same notion. It is my belief that the defendants have nothen’ in the law, facts, evidence and story to support their defense of wrong doings. They may think they have nothen’ to lose but are delusional.

Following is the answer to the amicus brief filed by California’s Attorney General. Klaus has clearly presented our views without any prejudice towards the opinion of the Attorney General’ lawyers.

Government Code, Title One, section 810.2 says: “Employee” includes an officer, judicial officer as defined in Section 327 of the Election Code, employee or servant whether or not compensated, but does not include an independent contractor. Section 811.4 says, “Public employee” means an employee of a public entity.

The Law Revision Commission comments are, “Liability and immunity provisions in Division 3.6 are often made to “public employees.” These provisions will not be applicable to independent contractors since the term “employee” is defined in section 810.2 to exclude independent contractors.

By specific language in CDAA contract with the State of California, the lawyers are not employees but independent contractors. Contract # 40920043 between Department of Industrial Relations and California District Attorneys Association, section 4(e) says, “The employment of all circuit prosecutors, investigators and all other personnel utilized by the CDAA in accomplishing the Purpose of this agreement shall be deemed to be employees of the CDAA.”

The carpetbaggers did not follow the law in seeking the privilege to practice prosecution in little Sierra County. It is not a mere technicality that the law was not followed. What about the Miranda Rights law? Is it a mere technicality that should be brushed aside when an accused criminal is not read his rights? Killers have walked free because of a lapse of a “technicality.

Comments welcomed or suggestions on how to broaden the awareness that members of the California State Bar expect absolute immunity from abusing the meaning of our laws and the dignity of our courts. The AG's brief can be read on this topic, entered on 10/17/2006. Here is Klaus’s brief.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

MICHAEL M. MILLER, et al.,
Appeal No. C051696
Plaintiff and Respondent
From Sierra County
Superior Court Case
No. 6293

GALE FILTER, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants

ANSWER OF RESPONDENT
ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE MINE, INC.
TO AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Appeal From Sierra County Superior Court,
Honorable Stanley C. Young, Judge

KLAUS J. KOLB (SBN 146531)
400 Capitol Mall, 11th Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814
Telephone: (916) 558-6160
Facsimile: (916) 492-0598
Attorney for Respondent
ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE
MINE, INC.

INTRODUCTION

The Attorney General submitted its Amicus Curiae Brief (“ACB”) in support of the Appellants “to underscore the importance of prosecutorial immunity in fostering unflinching and impartial law enforcement,” and because the Attorney General perceived that the Sierra County Superior Court improperly focused on defendants’ failure to comply with “technical details” and “procedural niceties” rather than on “the prosecutorial function they performed.” ACB 1, 9.
Respondent Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc., shares the Attorney General’s goal of fostering unflinching and impartial law enforcement. Impartial law enforcement would have prevented the serious harm to Respondent that gave rise to this action.
Respondent also agrees with the Attorney General’s argument that “[t]he purpose of providing immunity for prosecutors and judges is to provide a prompt procedural escape hatch, so that public servants are not exposed to time-consuming personal attacks based on their public service.” ACB 3 [italics added]. However, the Attorney General’s argument that prosecutorial immunity depends solely on whether a defendant allegedly carried out a “prosecutorial function” obviously goes too far, particularly when it is applied to private parties, who have financial incentives and ulterior motives that are inconsistent with public service. The Attorney General’s suggestion that prosecutorial immunity depends solely on whether someone purported to carry out a “prosecutorial function” would automatically immunize all actions of private bounty hunters and vigilantes, and the conduct of those who unlawfully impersonate police officers or district attorneys. Such a rule would clearly be inconsistent with the Attorney General’s and the Respondent’s goal of fostering unflinching and impartial law enforcement.
The Attorney General argues that “[t]he public is best served when public servants are free from fear.” ACB 5. However, the Attorney General does not cite any reason or authority that suggests that the public is best served when private parties are automatically immunized from all consequences when they wrongfully assume the powers of public officials, and misuse those powers for financial gain and ulterior motives. Under those circumstances, the public is better served when “the important societal goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by willful or negligent acts ... prevail[s].” Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 792-93, quoting Ramos v. County of Madera (1971) 4 Cal.3d 685, 692.
Respondent Original Sixteen-To-One Mine respectfully suggests that the Attorney General, in his rush to protect prosecutorial immunity for public officials, has not focused on the procedural context for this appeal. This is not an appeal from a trial, in which a trier of fact has found true only those facts alleged by defendants. This appeal arises from an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, filed by defendants after only minimal discovery by either party, in which the Court must credit any admissible evidence, or any reasonable inferences from that evidence, submitted by plaintiff/respondent Original Sixteen-To-One Mine.
The Attorney General’s argument appears to be predicated on the assumption that the only difference between defendants and a duly appointed deputy district attorney is that the defendants’ appointment papers were not properly filed – a “shortcoming” in defendants’ appointments that “can best be described as a technicality ....” ACB 1, 2, 8, 9. The Attorney General’s argument therefore assumes as true one of defendants’ arguments, and ignores all of the other evidence submitted by Respondent Original Sixteen-To-One Mine.
Respondent vigorously objects to the Attorney General’s assumption that this case is about a “technicality” or some “shortcoming” with respect to “procedural niceties.” What is at issue in this case is whether a private party can improperly assume the powers of elected government officials, misuse those powers for ulterior purposes, and then claim automatic and complete immunity for any damages that result. Among the evidence and reasonable inferences the Attorney General ignores are the facts that:
(1) CDAA, a private entity, had a financial incentive to initiate a prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One regardless of the merits of that prosecution, because CDAA was attempting to demonstrate that it deserved an extension of its contract with the Department of Industrial Relations (“DIR”) (3 C.T. 459, 456, 458; 4 C.T. 827, 979);

(2) CDAA pressed for a criminal prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One Mine despite the fact that the state and federal agencies responsible for investigating worker safety at the mine had concluded that there were no “willful” violations of any safety regulations at the Mine (3 C.T. 476, 481-84; 4 C.T. 810, 818, 829-830, 899-909; RJN Exs. 2, 3);

(3) The Sierra County District Attorney did not request assistance from CDAA and expressed no desire to prosecute Original Sixteen-To-One Mine during the almost thirteen months between the date of the accident and the date CDAA representatives personally “presented” their proposed criminal prosecution to the District Attorney – “CDAA came to her with a completed investigation proposing to file criminal charges ... and forced their way into Sierra County” (4 C.T. 810, 812; 3 C.T. 465; 2 C.T. 449, 436);

(4) The CDAA did not carry out its prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One Mine under the supervision and control of the elected District Attorney, as required by state law and its contract with DIR, but rather pursued the prosecution despite the fact that the elected District Attorney “wanted nothing to do with the issue and saw no crime ...” and “said she was not participating in the case ....” (4 C.T. 778-780, 810, 812-13, 819-820, 843; 2 C.T. 270); and

(5) CDAA then initiated an improper prosecution and improperly obtained an indictment, which the Superior Court subsequently dismissed due to CDAA’s misconduct (1 C.T. 81-88), and which the newly elected District Attorney chose not to pursue (4 C.T. 827, 992-993; 2 C.T. 280).

Finally and most importantly, the Attorney General’s Amicus Brief makes no attempt to even address defendants’ burden of proof on an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. No matter how important prosecutorial immunity may be to the Attorney General, an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss cannot be converted into an appeal of a motion for directed verdict or trial judgment merely because the Attorney General has determined that “the record is sufficiently well developed” to dismiss the defendants based on their claim of immunity. ACB 3, 9. The Attorney General’s suggestion that the Court ignore defendants’ burden of proof on an anti-SLAPP motion and simply dismiss the claims against defendants because “judicial economy favor[s] expeditious resolution of the immunity question by the Court of Appeal, rather than remanding for a subsequent summary judgment” is totally without merit, completely contrary to the California Supreme Court’s directions on how the anti-SLAPP statute should be applied, and would violate plaintiffs’ rights to due process.
ARGUMENT

A. Neither the CDAA Defendants’ Nor The Attorney General Are Permitted To Use An Anti-SLAPP Motion To Seek Dismissal Unless They First Prove That This Action Arises From Protected Speech Or Petitioning Activity.

It is by now well-settled that a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, California Code of Civil Procedure (“C.C.P.”) section 425.16, can only be granted if it strictly complies with the requirements of that statute. As the California Supreme Court recently summarized in Soukup v. Law Offices Of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 278-79:
“Section 425.16 posits . . . a two-step process for determining whether an action is a SLAPP. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity . . . . If the court finds that such a showing has been made, it must then determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 88.) “Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute – i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit – is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Id. at p. 89.) [Italics in original.]

Neither defendants nor the Attorney General is entitled to even reach the “minimal merit” phase of anti-SLAPP review – the phase in which defendants’ claims of prosecutorial immunity become relevant – unless defendants first prove that their conduct at issue “arises from protected speech or petitioning activity ....” Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89. As the Supreme Court affirmed in Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 313, “[t]he ‘scope of [section 425.16] is not without limits, as demonstrated in . . . cases finding lawsuits were not within its protection.’ [Citations omitted.]” In Flatley, for example, the Supreme Court affirmed earlier cases that found that undisputably unlawful activity is not constitutionally protected, and therefore does not qualify for the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute. Id. at 320.
In this case, the Superior Court correctly concluded that defendants’ conduct of unlawfully assuming the powers of a district attorney to improperly criminally prosecute the plaintiffs was not conduct protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech or petition. See Respondent’s Brief at 21-38. The Attorney General’s Amicus Brief does not even address this prong of the anti-SLAPP statute, and instead appears to suggest that the Court simply skip ahead and dismiss the claims against defendants based on the Attorney General’s definition of prosecutorial immunity, regardless of whether or not this action qualifies for the anti-SLAPP statute. See, e.g., ACB 9.
The Attorney General’s suggestion that the Court simply dismiss all claims against defendants because “judicial economy favored expeditious resolution of the immunity question by the Court of Appeal, rather than remand for a subsequent summary judgment,” is completely inconsistent with the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute, and contrary to the Supreme Court’s directions on how that statute must be applied. The only supporting authority cited by the Attorney General, Buford v. State of California (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 811, 826, involved an appeal from a
successful demurrer, and had nothing to do with the anti-SLAPP statute. In Buford, the Court of Appeal sustained a demurrer because Govt Code §854.8 immunized public entities from any injury proximately caused by a patient of a mental institution. Although respondent had not cited the same statute below, the Buford court noted that a demurrer may be sustained without leave to amend if there is no reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment, even if a certain “defects of substance” are raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 818, 826.
This is not an appeal from a demurrer, or from a judgment after trial. The Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed out that the special protections provided by the anti-SLAPP motion, including the attorney fee shifting provision, cannot be used for purposes other than those expressly set forth in the statute. In Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 65-66, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the fee shifting provisions of the anti-SLAPP statute against constitutional challenge by explaining:
Contrary to Equilon’s assertion, our conclusion will not allow the anti-SLAPP statute itself to become a weapon to chill the exercise of protected petitioning activity by people with legitimate grievances. The anti-SLAPP remedy is not available where a probability exists that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits. (§425.16, subd. (b).) “The Legislature, moreover, has provided, and California courts have recognized, substantive and procedural limitations that protect plaintiffs against overbroad application of the anti-SLAPP mechanism.” (Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1122-1123).
. . . Most importantly, section 425.16 requires every defendant seeking its protection to demonstrate that the subject cause of action is in fact one “arising from” the defendant’s protected speech or petitioning activity (§425.16, subd. (b).)
In Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 324, the Supreme Court again resisted an argument that the anti-SLAPP statute be extended to protect policies (the litigation privilege) that are not part of the statute.
Section 425.16 is not concerned with securing for litigants freedom of access to the judicial process. The purpose of section 425.16 is to protect the valid exercise of constitutional rights of free speech and petition from abuse of the judicial process (§425.16, subd. (a)), by allowing a defendant to bring a motion to strike any action that arises from any activity by the defendant in furtherance of those rights. (§425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
Similarly, the purpose of section 425.16 is not on “shielding prosecutors from civil suits arising from their work ...,” even if the Attorney General believes “the record is sufficiently well developed” to adopt the broad interpretation of prosecutorial immunity urged in the Amicus Brief. ACB 3, 9. Unless defendants or the Attorney General first prove that defendants’ conduct in unlawfully assuming the powers of a district attorney to wrongfully prosecute Respondent was in furtherance of their valid exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and petition, the Attorney General must wait for another motion in another forum to argue for expanding the scope of prosecutorial immunity. For the reasons already set forth in Respondent’s Brief at 21-38, neither defendants nor the Attorney General are entitled to reach the issue of prosecutorial immunity in this case, because this case does not arise from conduct by defendants that is protected by the constitutional rights of free speech or petition.

B. The Attorney General’s Arguments For Applying Prosecutorial Immunity To This Case Improperly Ignore Plaintiff’s Evidence.

As noted above, the Attorney General’s argument for applying prosecutorial immunity to defendants in this case appears to be predicated on the assumption that the only thing distinguishing these defendants from any duly elected or appointed district attorney is a “technicality” or some “shortcoming” with respect to “procedural niceties.” ACB 1, 2, 8, 9. In so doing, the Attorney General has assumed as true defendant’s version of the facts, and ignored all of the other evidence submitted by Respondent Original Sixteen-To-One Mine. The Attorney General’s argument thereby again ignores the requirements of the anti-SLAPP statute.
In Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 278, the Supreme Court described the procedure to be applied to an anti-SLAPP motion once an action is shown to arise from the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech or petition for the redress of grievances:
“Section 425.16 therefore establishes a procedure where the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.” [Citations omitted.]

It is well-settled that a court applying this summary-judgment-like procedure to an anti-SLAPP motion “may not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence.” Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90, 105; Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 823. An anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss therefore must be denied if the plaintiff has presented admissible evidence, “and all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence, ...” that show “a probability exists that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits. (§425.16, subd. (b).)” C.C.P. 437c subd. (c); Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.4th at 65.
The Attorney General’s argument for applying prosecutorial immunity in this case is based entirely and improperly on the assumption that the only thing distinguishing defendants from any duly elected or appointed district attorney is a missing appointment paper in the Sierra County files. What the Attorney General ignores is crucial in determining whether defendants in this case deserve an extension of prosecutorial immunity, even if it were assumed that defendants could reach the “minimal merit” prong of the anti-SLAPP inquiry in this case. Among other things, the Attorney General ignores the following evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence:
(1) CDAA is a private entity, with a financial incentive to initiate prosecutions. For example, at about the same time that CDAA obtained a preliminary hearing on the criminal charges it filed against Respondent, CDAA sent a letter to the California Department of Industrial Relations (“DIR”) referring to efforts to extend its contract with DIR, and cited its prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One Mine as an example of the progress CDAA was making. 4 C.T. 813, 827, 840, 974-982.
(2) CDAA pressed for a criminal prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One Mine despite the fact that the state and federal agencies responsible for investigating worker safety at the mine had concluded that there were no “willful” violations of any safety regulations at the Mine (3 C.T. 476, 481-84; 4 C.T. 810, 818, 829-830, 899-909; RJN Exs. 2, 3).
(3) The Sierra County District Attorney did not request assistance from CDAA and expressed no desire to prosecute Original Sixteen-To-One Mine during the almost thirteen months between the date of the accident and the date CDAA representatives personally “presented” their proposed criminal prosecution to the District Attorney. A jury could infer that the November 16, 2001 letter that was personally “presented” to the Sierra County District Attorney by CDAA defendants contained an implicit direction that the District Attorney cooperate with CDAA defendants. 3 C.T. 465. This inference is supported by the District Attorney’s subsequent admission that: “CDAA came to her with a completed investigation proposing to file criminal charges ... She told me that she disliked CDAA and how they forced their way into Sierra County and how they behaved. She said it was a powerful organization that could do what it wanted.” (4 C.T. 810, 812; 3 C.T. 465; 2 C.T. 449, 436).
(4) The CDAA did not carry out its prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One Mine under the supervision and control of the elected District Attorney, as required by state law and its contract with DIR (3 C.T. 453-56), but rather pursued the prosecution despite the fact that the elected District Attorney “wanted nothing to do with the issue and saw no crime ...” and “said she was not participating in the case ....” 4 C.T. 810, 812-13. The District Attorney told several witnesses, including the local newspaper, words to the effect that: “Oh, I don’t know anything about that [the prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One Mine]. You’ll have to ask the California District Attorney’s Association lawyer.” 2 C.T. 270; 4 C.T. 778-780, 812-813; 819-820, 843. The declarations of CDAA defendants submitted in support of the motion confirm the fact that CDAA defendants knew they were not supervised by the District Attorney – the CDAA declarations can barely come up with any communications between the District Attorney and CDAA defendants during the entire prosecution of Respondent, from CDAA defendants’ first meeting with the District Attorney on November 27, 2001, until CDAA defendants obtained the improper Grand Jury Indictment on October 29, 2002. 2 C.T. 422 - 450, see Respondent’s Brief at 10-14.
(5) CDAA defendants initiated an improper prosecution and improperly obtained an indictment, which the Superior Court subsequently dismissed due to CDAA’s misconduct (1 C.T. 81-88), and which the newly elected District Attorney chose not to pursue (4 C.T. 827, 992-993; 2 C.T. 280). Among other things, CDAA defendants abandoned the preliminary hearing that they had set once it became clear that Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc., intended to present exculpatory evidence, and CDAA defendants then failed to present known exculpatory evidence to the Grand Jury. 1 C.T. 81-88; 2 C.T. 426, 3 C.T. 450; 4 C.T. 784-86; 813-14, 817-18, 827, 844-46, 859-98, 969-70, 998; see generally, Respondent’s Brief at 15-18.
As the foregoing review of plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates, the misconduct at issue in this case goes far beyond a mere “technicality” or procedural shortcoming. Plaintiffs’ complaint charges defendants with improperly assuming the power of a district attorney, in violation of the California Constitution (Articles V, §13, and XI, §1(b)) and California statutes (e.g., Govt Code §§24101 and 24102), and with abusing those improperly assumed government powers to subject plaintiffs to an improper and malicious criminal prosecution. The Attorney General’s argument that prosecutorial immunity should be extended to these defendants because they are a mere “technicality” away from being legitimate state employees grossly mischaracterizes the evidence and what is at stake in this litigation. The Attorney General’s attempt to shortcut the anti-SLAPP procedure, and obtain a ruling based on assumed facts, also demonstrates the danger of misapplying the anti-SLAPP statute. As explained in Wilcox v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at 823:
In order to satisfy due process, the burden placed on the plaintiff must be compatible with the early stage at which the motion is brought and heard (§425.16, subds. (f) and (g)) and the limited opportunity to conduct discovery (subd. (g)). In order to preserve the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial the court’s determination of the motion cannot involve a weighing of the evidence. [Citations omitted.]

C. The Attorney General’s Authorities Do Not Support Extending Prosecutorial Immunity To CDAA Defendants.

Respondent has no quarrel with most of the Attorney General’s review of the history and purposes of prosecutorial immunity. Respondent does not dispute that prosecutorial immunity serves a valuable purpose when applied to public employees. However, Respondent parts company with the Attorney General to the extent the Attorney General wishes to extend the reach of prosecutorial immunity beyond the plain language of Government Code section 821.6, and grant automatic and complete immunity to private actors whenever they claim to be carrying out a prosecutorial function.
Government Code §821.6 provides:
A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.
Government Code §811.4 defines “Public employee” as “an employee of a public entity.” In its contract with DIR, CDAA unambiguously agreed that neither CDAA nor CDAA’s employees would be deemed employees of anyone other than CDAA. 3 C.T. 453, 456. The Attorney General does not dispute this. According to the plain language of the statute, CDAA employees therefore do not qualify for prosecutorial immunity because they are not “public employees.”
The Attorney General has not presented any good reason or authority that supports extending the reach of Government Code §821.6 beyond the plain meaning of the statute. California courts have long followed the rule that, “‘[w]here possible we follow the Legislature’s intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law ...” [Citations omitted.] Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 312. The
California Supreme Court has been particularly reluctant to expand the plain meaning of statutes when it comes to claims of immunity by alleged government actors. Thus in Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 40 Cal.3d at 792-93, the Supreme Court held: We have also held that, “in governmental tort cases ‘the rule is liability, immunity is the exception’ .... Unless the Legislature has clearly provided for immunity, the important societal goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by willful or negligent acts must prevail.” (Ramos v. County of Madera (1971) 4 Cal.3d 685, 692.

As the Attorney General notes, most of the recent cases cited by the Attorney General in support of the application of prosecutorial immunity are cases that apply Govt Code §821.6. All of those cases cited by the Attorney General apply prosecutorial immunity to persons who are conceded to be “public employees” acting within the scope of their duties. For example, Tur v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 897, 900, found immunity under Govt Code §821.6 for firefighters, and held that immunity under that statute was not limited to peace officers, but applied to various other public officials who performed prosecutorial functions. Jenkins v. County of Orange (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 278, 284, applied Govt Code §821.6 to a county social worker acting within the scope of her employment who initiated child custody proceedings. Kemmerer v. County of Fresno (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1426, 1437, found that public employees who performed prosecutorial functions in connection with a disciplinary proceeding were also immunized under Govt Code §821.6.
In each of these cases, courts looked at whether a defendant was performing “prosecutorial functions” after the courts had already concluded that the defendant was a public employee acting within the scope of his or her employment. None of those cases suggest that “prosecutorial function” could substitute for status as a “public employee” to qualify for absolute immunity under Govt Code §821.6.
Citations to cases that discuss immunity in the context of a federal civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, such as Greene v. Zank (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 497, and Horowitz v. Board of Medical Examiners (10th Cir. 1987) 822 F.2d 1508, do not help the Attorney General’s arguments about the interpretation of Govt Code §821.6 either, because immunity under section 1983 depends on federal law.
“Because section 1983 was intended by Congress as a remedy to prevent unconstitutional acts by state and local officials, we must look to federal law to determine the scope of immunity of governmental officials from a section 1983 suit. [Citations omitted.]”

Bradley v. Medical Board (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 445, 454. Even California cases involving section 1983 claims do not attempt to use Govt Code §821.6 to define the scope of immunity. See, e.g., Bradley, supra; Greene v. Zank, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at 503-09. Moreover, under federal law, even duly appointed prosecutors may be entitled to only qualified immunity, rather than the absolute prosecutorial immunity provided by Govt Code §821.6, depending on the precise function they were performing at the time. Bradley, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at 454.
Finally, the Attorney General makes fleeting reference to the “de facto” officer doctrine in an apparent effort to extend the prosecutorial immunity of Govt Code §821.6 to CDAA defendants in this case. However, none of the cases cited by the Attorney General holds that alleged status as a “de facto” officer qualifies a non-public employee for absolute immunity for his or her wrongful acts, either under Govt Code §821.6, or otherwise. Instead, the cases cited in support of the “de facto” officer doctrine, such as County of Ventura v. Barry (1929) 207 Cal.App.189, 190, and People v. Kempley (1928) 205 Cal. 441, 445-46, simply hold that the otherwise proper or “lawful” acts of a “de facto” officer are not subject to collateral attack. Neither of these cases holds that a “de facto” officer is automatically and completely immune for wrongful or unlawful acts committed while acting as a de facto officer, nor do these cases suggest that a “de facto” officer who is not a public employee qualifies for absolute immunity under Govt Code §821.6.
Moreover, as noted in Respondent’s Brief at 41-48, and as determined by the Superior Court (11 C.T. 2780), major factual issues remain about whether CDAA defendants meet the criteria required to qualify as “de facto” officers. See, e.g., In re Redevelopment Plan for Bunker Hill (1964) 61 Cal.2d 21, 42 (holding that the “lawful acts” of a de facto officer are not subject to collateral attack). Among other things, CDAA defendants themselves have submitted evidence that at least some members of the public – including plaintiffs and the local newspaper – did not “acquiesce” in CDAA’s attempt to assume the role of district attorneys. See, e.g., CDAA’s motion for change of venue, 1 C.T. 241 - 2 C.T. 333; 6 C.T. 1374-1577. CDAA defendants certainly admit that plaintiffs objected to CDAA defendants’ attempts to exercise the powers of the Sierra County District Attorney at the time CDAA carried out its wrongful prosecution. 3 C.T. 604-607, 619, 621; 4 C.T. 812-13, 839, 846; Appellants Opening Brief at 35-39. Further, plaintiffs’ evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence are sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that CDAA defendants had actual knowledge that they were acting outside the scope of their legal authority, as defined in CDAA’s contract with DIR, in that CDAA defendants did not act at the request of the local District Attorney, did not act under her supervision and control, and did not defer to the District Attorney’s charging, filing and settling authority. See Respondent’s Brief at 44-48.
The bottom line is that the Attorney General’s arguments to expand the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity to private parties merely because those private parties claim to be performing a public function are not supported by any California authorities and are not supported by good sense. As noted above, if the Attorney General’s arguments were applied as written, every vigilante, private bounty hunter, and imposter would qualify for automatic and absolute immunity for any injury or damage he or she causes while pretending to carry out a prosecutorial function. Such a broad scope of immunity cannot be what the Legislature intended when it chose the plain language of Govt Code §821.6. No policy reason offered by the Attorney General or CDAA supports such a broad extension of immunity to private parties who cause substantial injury to others. To the contrary, granting absolute immunity to anyone who claims to be acting on the public’s behalf would encourage more wrongdoing, immunize wrongdoers from the consequences of their actions, and leave injured parties, such as Respondent, without a remedy. CONCLUSION
The Attorney General explained that he filed an Amicus Brief in this case to “underscore the importance of prosecutorial immunity in fostering unflinching and impartial law enforcement.” ACB 1. Respondent shares the Attorney General’s goal. However, the Attorney General’s concerns about prosecutorial immunity are misplaced in the context of this appeal.
First, as an appeal of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, the defendants claims to prosecutorial immunity only become relevant if defendants first show that their conduct at issue arises out of the valid exercise of their constitutional rights of free speech or petition. For reasons set forth above and more fully in Respondent’s Brief, Respondent maintains that defendants do not have a constitutional right to wrongfully assume the powers of a district attorney and criminally prosecute a fellow citizen.
Second, the Attorney General’s concerns about a supposed erosion of prosecutorial privilege appear to be based on CDAA defendants’ version of the facts, and ignore the evidence submitted by plaintiffs. The Attorney General’s concerns are therefore based on assumed facts that do not reflect the actual misconduct at issue in this case.
In the final analysis, the Attorney General has no reason to be concerned about Respondents’ claims against CDAA defendants in this case. Nothing about Respondents’ claims will interfere with the ability of the Attorney General or any properly appointed or elected District Attorney to carry out his or her lawful duties. To the contrary, the Attorney General should support Respondent’s efforts to ensure that only duly elected or appointed public officials wield the extraordinary power that the California Constitution delegates to the Attorney General and the elected District Attorney for each County. Similarly, the Attorney General should support Respondent’s efforts to hold those who are not properly elected or appointed responsible for the injury and damages they cause when they assume powers to which they are not entitled, and then abuse those powers for ulterior or improper purposes.
In any event, Respondent respectfully submits that the Attorney General’s Amicus Brief does provide any reason to stretch the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute to deny Respondent the opportunity to prove its claims at trial. The CDAA defendants’ misconduct at issue in this case still does not arise from constitutionally protected free speech or petition rights, and Respondent has already demonstrated that its claims have the “minimal merit” required to avoid an early motion to dismiss. Respondent Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc., therefore again respectfully requests that the order of the Sierra County Superior Court denying defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted November 14, 2006,

Klaus J. Kolb
Attorney for Respondent
ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE
MINE, INC.









CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

The text of ANSWER OF RESPONDENT ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE MINE, INC., TO AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF ATTORNEY GENERAL consists of 5,376 words, as counted by the Corel WordPerfect version 9 word-processing software I used to generate this Brief.

Dated: November 14, 2006.
Klaus J. Kolb
Attorney for Respondent
ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE
MINE, INC.
 By Michael Miller

11/02/2006  3:32PM

Mining never stopped.

Adding real social benefits from a successful outcome of plaintiffs’ suit does not hinder or compromise our mining effort to daylight gold from the Sixteen to One vein. The pursuit of compensation, justice and accountability from some evil legal/political machinations is a positive undertaking, similar to that which was successfully undertaken against MSHA. Success will benefit shareholders’ equity, value and potential to exploit their exceptional mineral deposit. The effort is worth the reward or the reward is worth the effort.

The crew sacked high-grade last Tuesday, gold in two places showing, two slab rounds but, like most of our mining, the continuation and value of the pocket will not be known until after it is mined. Kind of reminds one of some of the problems associated with the study of geology; however, you will never know unless you go.
 By John Yuma

10/31/2006  7:26PM

get over it and get back to mining.
 By Michael Miller

10/31/2006  4:15PM

Most every adult in California and the United States of America know and have expressed their discontent with lawyers in modern times. It was not always this way. In fact sixty years ago people believed that lawyers were right up there with doctors in trust and social stature. What happened? Most importantly, what can be done about the sorry state of affairs regarding our lives, as lawyers continue to stink up the environment?

Is it true that the lawyers who form sentences with colorful words and metaphors will be the ones to subjugate the rules of society? Will they be the winners over the evidence and the law? A number of new TV shows seem to have this theme. Lawyers certainly do not add to America’s gross national product with many of their antics. An example of such drivel just passed into my hands in the form of Mr. Tom Knox’s reply brief to the august California Court of Appeals, 3rd District in Sacramento.

For those of you following the self serving, law breaking (misleading a grand jury), antics of the California District Attorneys Association and four of their non government employees, you know that I have the greatest respect for our legal system and hold many practicing lawyers in the highest esteem. Four of my former attorneys are Superior Court judges.

I write about this case with the hope that honorable men and women of law will seize this case with the passion they once held for lawyering. Remember years ago when every comedian, analyst and the average Joe or Joanne bantered lawyer joke after lawyer joke. The trade must have recognized the pit they were in. Jokes subsided but the root causes of America’s feelings about lawyers did not change. Today people have moved on to other target of scorn or sadly came to the conclusion that improvement would not materialize. No, no, no. Improvement is nearby. Improvement is vital for our society to keep pace with the microeconomics of a global economy. The bleeding of money into nonproductive work must stop. All that separates our American society from slavery are guns and the judges seated in our courtrooms. My bet goes with the courtroom.

So, what is the improvement to clean the scene lurking nearby? Fortunately, in California there is a State Bar with rules of conduct legislated into law by our elected representatives. There are consequences for misbehavior: disbarment and criminal prosecution if probable cause exists. Lawyers are like doctors in that they hate to testify let alone prosecute one of their own. Why is beyond me. This is how we survive as a free and independent country. I know that the code was broken for doctors two decades ago. I had such an experience with a doctor who was knowledgeable about the death of my seven-year-old son at the University of California at Davis hospital in Sacramento and not afraid or too busy to speak out. Because of him and because of what I did about his disclosure, changes were made that may have saved seriously injured children in an emergency room.

So today another opportunity exists to improve the American or at least the Californian judicial system. You should be outraged at Mr. Tom Knox’s assertions along with his arrogant style of presentation to the 3rd Appellate Court.. You will be, but that may not be enough. The CDAA gang worked to infiltrate a small rural public office; they solicited business through its non profit corporation of taxpayers money, they played politics with the law; they violated the trust of Californians and sought to privatize prosecution and criminalize accidents; they indicted without probable cause, knowingly, I might add. Now they want to get a pass on the theory that they are not responsible for their behavior, are immune from accountability and free to continue to screw up people’s lives and businesses.

You should be outraged. You should also recognize that opportunities to correct the long-standing decline in professional behavior of lawyers are before the Court. Lloyds of London is paying for Mr. Knox. We do not have that luxury. What we do have is the law and the truth of the sinister lawyering performed by Gale Filter, who led an inexperienced subordinate and two others to conspire in Sierra County. Help me change the course of unacceptable behavior.

This brief is 39 pages. I’m not sure how to get it broadly distributed. I will make copies and mail to anyone asking until we find another way. Here is the thrust and tone of Mr. Tom Knox’s fictional prose. It is in his conclusion. “The conduct of Appellants that forms the gravamen of Respondent’s case – the prosecution – falls within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute. Appellants’ conduct as prosecutors was not illegal…… As to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP test, Appellants are entitled to the benefit of prosecutorial immunity and the litigation privilege.” If in the minds of the defendants they are “entitled to the benefit” they hold themselves out to be a privileged class of Californians, something the constitution speaks directly to.

So, why did the Attorney General step into this case? Here is one answer that few know. CDAA recently admitted that several counties in California failed to properly swear deputy DA’s as required by law. When a new DA is elected, his or her deputies must be appointed in writing under strict rules. Think about how disruptive this could be for convicted inmates when they learn that the man or woman prosecuting them was not authorized to do so. Oh, my goodness! What a mess! What a potentially costly mess! Fortunately for California, the issues of our case will not set a precedent for others to barter a new trial. Why? (CDAA likely did not tell the AG’s office as they lobbied to get it to write an amicus brief in support of their unlawful activities in Sierra County) Why? In other counties the other deputy DA’s are government employees. The CDAA gang is non-government employees, a big difference.

When I learned about the admissions by a CDAA employee about the plight of real deputy DA’s, I too became concerned. It is my intentions to improve the law not find a reason for others to circumvent real crime. I telephoned my old attorney, who represented me in Santa Barbara in 1969. He is a Superior Court judge now. I explained the situation (he knew about the criminal indictment filed against me and the mine). He said, “Mike, that is not your problem or concern. Do what you need to do. Let the legal ramifications fall where they will.” It was free advice and good advice. What are the next steps to take?

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